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Talks and Meetings with Charles Hartshorne
Donald Wayne Viney

Charles Hartshorne by Michelle Bakay

I knew Charles Hartshorne (June 5, 1897 – October 9, 2000) for the last two decades of
his life. One does not easily forget a meeting with him: the smiling eyes behind wire-rimmed
glasses; the disheveled eyebrows; the beak-like nose; the voice, pitched high with age, cracking
with excitement at some philosophical insight; the slightly disconcerting sense of selfimportance tempered by humility before the genius of Plato, Peirce, or Whitehead; the witty
anecdotes; the fondness for birds; the blink and nod that bade a charming farewell. His small
frame and mail-order clothes only served to bring into relief that one was conversing with a
surviving member of the pantheon of twentieth century philosophers, many of whom he knew.
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Hartshorne’s reputation for entertaining conversation was well-deserved. All who knew
the man have their favorite “Hartshorne stories” and I am no exception. The following pages,
culled from notes that I took over the years, chronicle my meetings and other encounters with the
person that John B. Cobb, Jr. called “a strange and alien greatness.”1 I have added numerous
footnotes and annotations to the original notes and I have included photographs. My major
meetings with Hartshorne are listed below as a kind of table of contents:
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April 1976: I was an undergraduate student at Colorado State University (Fort Collins,
Colorado), studying with Donald Crosby, still rather new to the world of philosophy. Crosby
invited some of his students to attend a conference in Denver—I cannot recall whether it was at
Iliff, Regis, or elsewhere. The conference was on Whitehead and Buddhism. The only wellknown names at the conference that I recall were Robert Neville, John Wisdom (who was a
visiting professor at Colorado State), and Hartshorne. Hartshorne’s paper is the only one I
remember being read, but alas, I did not understand it.2 I recall that we sat in a large circle and
after Hartshorne finished speaking a Japanese fellow stood up to respond. His accent was
heavy—he called Hartshorne “Professor Hot-So”—and his response was so lengthy, so lengthy
that I guessed the point he was trying to make was lost on most of those present.3 Hartshorne
made some clever remark but again, unhappily, I do not remember it. Afterwards, Crosby related
that someone had asked Wisdom what he thought of Hartshorne’s talk. His reply was, “I could
make nothing of it.” I could have said the same thing, but from me, it would have been a mere

1

John B. Cobb, Jr., “The Philosophy of Charles Hartshorne,” Process Studies 21/2 (Summer 1992): 84.
The paper was published as “Process Themes in Chinese Thought,” Journal of Chinese Philosophy 6
(1979): 323-336.
3
My good friend Grier Jefferis was in attendance. He reminded me of the funny pronunciation of
Hartshorne’s name.
2
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report; from an ordinary language philosopher like Wisdom, it may have been intended as a
devastating criticism.4
My only exposure to Hartshorne, prior to the Denver meeting, was reading some of his
writings for a paper I had written in March 1976 (in Crosby’s History of Philosophy class) on
Descartes’ Fifth Meditation argument. I had read a little of Hartshorne’s Anselm’s Discovery
(1965), the article in Hick and McGill’s anthology, The Many-Faced Argument (1967), and some
of Eugene Peters, Hartshorne and Neoclassical Metaphysics (1970). It was a respectable paper
but I was still being misled by Paul Tillich’s idea that God is not a being but Being-Itself. In
Hartshorne’s philosophy, “[God’s existence] is not one among the facts of existence, for it
pervades all facts, actual or possible.” That sounds a bit like Tillich, but Hartshorne argues that
the full reality of God is the ways in which God knows and responds to the universe of creatures,
and this he calls God’s actuality. The existence of God is, then, “the least common denominator
of all possible contingent divine actualities—a class which cannot be empty, though it has no
necessary members . . .” 5
November 1979: Peter Hutcheson and I were graduate students at the University of
Oklahoma. We had gone to Austin, Texas to a Southwestern Philosophical Society Meeting. The
only two well-known philosophers that I remember at this conference were Alvin Plantinga and
Hartshorne, although I’m sure there were many others. At lunch Peter and I drove around Austin
trying to find some place to eat other than the school cafeteria. After an exasperating hour of
hunting for a parking place we returned to the convention center to face cafeteria food. We
happened to sit at a table adjacent to where Hartshorne was eating. When the people at his table
left, Hartshorne brought his tray over to our table and asked if he could sit with us. For the next
forty-five minutes he entertained us with philosophical remarks and humorous anecdotes.
If I had any doubts that I was in the presence of genius they were dispelled during the
session when Plantinga gave his talk. I was spellbound by Plantinga’s ability to field difficult
questions. Plantinga presented his paper—which had something to do with the ontological
argument—in a very large lecture hall that would hold several hundred. A fellow far in the back
of the room objected in a rather swaggering and self-confident manner, “Isn’t existence a strange
sort of property? It’s like Russell said, if you were listing the properties of a Zebra you wouldn’t
list existence.” Plantinga pointed out that this was no objection to the argument. Zebras have a
4
Hartshorne’s view of Wisdom’s philosophy is that it artificially separates analytic and speculative views
in metaphysics. This criticism is evident in Hartshorne’s review of Wisdom’s Problems of Mind and Matter (1934),
International Journal of Ethics 45, 4 (1935): 461-463. See also the discussion of Wisdom’s seminal article, “Gods”,
in Hartshorne, The Logic of Perfection (La Salle, Illinois: Open Court, 1962): 148-160). Hartshorne found Wisdom’s
approach to philosophy provincially English, ignoring philosophical achievement outside of Cambridge. “Like so
many present-day English writers, [Wisdom] confines his attention almost wholly to other Englishmen, excluding of
course one who (I suppose) ceased to be among the elect when he crossed the Atlantic and simultaneously went
off into Speculative Philosophy [i.e. Whitehead].” Review of Wisdom’s Philosophy and Psycho-Analysis (1953).
Ethics 63, 4 (1953): 317-318.
5
The last two quotes are from The Logic of Perfection: 156 and 158.
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lot of strange properties, like being over two inches tall, that we wouldn’t list. Hartshorne also
stood up to make a comment on Plantinga’s presentation. Once again, I do not recall the
specifics, although I believe it had to do with their different approaches to modalities. At any
rate, it was clear that Hartshorne’s objection was not half-baked and there was not a hint of
pretentiousness in his demeanor. When he sat down he and Plantinga had agreed to disagree.
It is one of my regrets that I knew so little philosophy, even at that time, that I could not
follow the train of reasoning that Plantinga and Hartshorne pursued. Nevertheless, the exchange
was transformative for me, for when I returned home after the conference I read everything I
could find on Hartshorne’s philosophy. It was a turning point in my philosophical development.
December 1979: I wrote a rhyme titled “Ontological Sonnet” and sent it to Hartshorne.
He responded within ten days and graciously refrained from criticizing my poetry.
December 1980 – January 1981: I chose Hartshorne’s work on the ontological
argument for my dissertation topic. Unbeknownst to me, Robert Shahan, the chairperson of the
philosophy department, sent my proposal to Hartshorne and invited him to be on my doctoral
committee. Hartshorne agreed to be a committee member but he pointed out that George
Goodwin had already written extensively on his treatment of the ontological argument.6
Hartshorne noted that no one had written on his global argument. I settled on this topic for my
dissertation, amazed that Hartshorne had agreed to be on my committee.
February 21-25, 1981: Shahan invited Hartshorne to Norman. Hartshorne gave public
lectures in Norman and at the Unitarian Church in Oklahoma City. I chauffeured him around and
talked with him at length about philosophy. I recall taking him to a drug store to find medicine
for a bug bite on his leg. We had a meal at Shahan’s house and then Hartshorne and I took a long
walk around the neighborhood. The evening before he returned to Austin, Hartshorne invited me
to his room where we talked for a little while. When I arose to leave he said, “You’re the kind of
student teachers live for.” For several days thereafter, I hardly seemed to touch the ground when
I walked.
I recorded the following notes from those meetings in Oklahoma on February 28, 1981.
In the original notes, I included a preface expressing my admiration for Hartshorne and his
importance to philosophy. I spoke of Whitehead as less rigorous in argument than Hartshorne, a
judgment that today I would not make. Whitehead was as rigorous as any philosopher. On the
question of conceiving God, he had a creative burst of thinking from about 1925 until 1933 that
may be unprecedented in philosophical literature. What seemed to me in 1981 as a lack of rigor
is more properly thought of as a development of radically new ideas about deity. In any event, it
was Hartshorne thoughts, not Whitehead’s, that I was interested in highlighting.

6

George L. Goodwin, The Ontological Argument of Charles Hartshorne, with a Foreword by Charles
Hartshorne, Dissertation Series 20 (Missoula, Montana: American Academy of Religion and Scholar’s Press, 1978).
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CH = Charles Hartshorne; DV = Don Viney
CH: Aristotle would have understood the ontological argument. He saw that the eternal is
the necessary.
DV: True, but he would have proved too much. For he felt the spheres were eternal.
CH: Yes, Aristotle went beyond the empirical observation in that.
*

*

*

CH: If you’re a determinist, it’s your responsibility.
*

*

*

DV: If you could invite any five persons in history to dinner who would you invite?
CH: [As if thinking to himself] Well, I should certainly like to talk with [Charles] Peirce.
Leibniz would also be good.
DV: Would you not invite Kant?
CH: Kant is the most overrated philosopher of all. Leibniz is the most underrated.
[I don’t recall that Professor Hartshorne ever completed the list of five persons, although I
remember that everyone he mentioned was a philosopher.]
*

*

*

DV: Gertrude Stein said that a bell went off in her head any time she met a genius. She
said it went off twice in her life, once when she met Whitehead, and once when she met Picasso.
CH: Yes, I believe that bell went off also when I met Whitehead. He was certainly a
genius. The bell did not go off when I met Husserl, although it did go off when I met Heidegger.
I suppose Heidegger was a genius, in a grim sort of way.7 Husserl was not a genius, but he did
work very hard.
*

*

*

DV: The idea of an actual infinite is crucial to your philosophy but there are some serious
paradoxes in the idea. William Lane Craig has done a great deal to revive these problems.8
CH: I maintain that time must extend infinitely into the past and indefinitely into the
future. If the nature of reality is that the many become one and are increased by one [Whitehead],
then the idea of a first moment of time is nonsense. There is absolutely no analogy in experience
7

Hartshorne later made it clear to me that he was referring to Heidegger’s grim personality.
At the time of this conversation, Craig’s The Kalām Cosmological Argument (London: Macmillan, 1979)
was a recent publication.
8
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for the concept of creation ex nihilo. Some of the paradoxes of an actual infinite, such as the
paradox of Hilbert’s Hotel, rest upon the mistake of spatializing time [Bergson]. I suspect that
space is finite but time is infinite. My son-in-law is a mathematician and used to be a finitist. But
now he is not so sure and leans towards the opposite view. I once asked [Bertrand] Russell if by
adding a finite number to an infinite number one produces a new totality.9 He said yes. Although
the two numbers are numerically identical, both being infinite, there is nevertheless a qualitative
difference. There is a new totality. The many become one and are increased by one.
*

*

*

CH: The God that some say is dead was never alive.
*

*

*

CH: Perhaps I should call my book “The Structure of Experience” rather than “The
Structure of Creativity.” What do you think?
DV: “The Structure of Experience” is maybe nearer to the mark. Creativity has no
structure, there are only instances of it, but experience does have a structure, the most general
feature of which is creativity.
CH: Yes, perhaps you are right. Maybe I’ll call it “The Structure of Experience.”10
*

*

*

CH: My new book on the history of philosophy has an entire chapter on Wittgenstein.11 I
went through the notebooks, Zettel, and marked everything I could agree with. There is actually
quite a bit I agree with in Wittgenstein. I probably found more to agree with than most
Wittgensteinians could find. My former student and good friend, James Devlin, is very excited
about that chapter.
*

*

*

DV: Towards the end of Creative Synthesis and Philosophic Method you make a
comment in passing about the reason for death. Would you explain your views on death?

9

See Hartshorne’s Creative Synthesis and Philosophic Method (La Salle, Illinois: Open Court, 1970): 126.
In hindsight, I realized that the book we were discussing was one that he would never see published. It
was my good fortune to be the main editor for that book, Creative Experiencing: A Philosophy of Freedom, edited
by D. W. Viney and Jincheol O (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2011).
11
Hartshorne, Insights and Oversights of Great Thinkers: An Evaluation of Western Philosophy (Albany:
State University of New York Press, 1983), chapter 25.
10
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CH: Oh, yes, I had forgotten that. The point is that the older a person becomes the fewer
novel things there are to enjoy. I suppose a person could learn a new language in his old age. But
there are only a finite number of languages. Pretty soon you run out of things to do.
DV: It strikes me that you are an exception, a counter-example, to your own thesis. You
remind me of my great grandmother who always remained young at heart.
CH: Yes, there are differences among older people. But the differences are all finite.
There is an infinite gap between ourselves and God. There are only a finite number of things
open to a finite being. It is different with God.12
*

*

*

DV: Dr. Hartshorne, you claim that the future is indefinite while the past is definite.
Knowledge of the future, except as possibility, is therefore impossible, even for God. What do
you do with alleged cases of precognition?
CH: Well, I don’t know what to do with precognition. Michael Scriven believes he has
experimental confirmation of precognition. A good friend of mine and a well-known statistician
is unconvinced by Scriven’s example. For my part, I should hate to rest my entire metaphysics
on one example.
*

*

*

CH: What causes atheists? Mostly theologians with a medieval concept of a God that
eliminates human freedom by determining human decisions.
*

*

*

CH: My daughter calls me a pre-Freudian. She says I have not taken Freud seriously
enough.
*

*

*

CH: My son-in-law told me once that he is not a Hartshornean, but that he is a Buddhist.
And then he added, “There’s really no difference.” Perhaps he is right. At least there is some
truth to what he says.
12

Hartshorne treats this subject at length in “The Aesthetic Meaning of Death,” chapter 4 of Wisdom as
Moderation: A Philosophy of the Middle Way (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987). Hartshorne
published two earlier articles on this topic: “The Acceptance of Death.” Philosophical Aspects of Thanatology, Vol.
1. Edited by Florence M. Hetzler and Austin H. Kutscher (New York: MSS Information Corporation, 1978): 83-87 and
“A Philosophy of Death.” Philosophical Aspects of Thanatology, Vol. 2. Edited by Florence M. Hetzler and A. H.
Kutscher (New York: MSS Information Corporation, 1978): 81-89.
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*

*

*

DV: In Creative Synthesis you claim that necessary truths are known, if at all, only a
priori. [Saul] Kripke thinks there are necessary truths which can be known a posteriori.13
CH: What are Kripke’s examples?
DV: Kripke says that “The morning star is the evening star” is a necessary truth since it
would be false only if Venus was not identical to Venus. But we learn the truth of the statement
empirically, not by an examination of concepts.
CH: Ah, yes. But you see, Kripke’s example is only of a hypothetical necessity. If Venus
had never existed then “The morning star is the evening star” would not have been a necessary
truth. But what is true of all possible worlds could never be knowable empirically.14
*

*

*

CH: Meeting my wife was one of the luckier things that happened to me. Not all women
would be compatible with me. No one should deny the reality of luck, both good luck and bad
luck. Common sense recognizes the reality of luck. It is a shame so many philosophers have
failed to take it into account.
*

*

*

CH: The name “Hartshorne” means “deer’s horn.” It has nothing to do with “shorne.”
The “s” is possessive. People back East say “Harts-horne.” Here in the west they are more likely
to say “Hart-shorne.” I never really noticed the difference until my wife pointed it out to me. But
the correct pronunciation is “Harts-horne.”
*

*

*

DV: Whitehead never seems to have had much use for Kant. Somewhere in Process and
Reality he says, “Kant founded the world on thought, apparently oblivious to the scanty supply
of thinking.”15
CH: Yes, that is typical. Once in a lecture he said that Kant did things backwards. He
should have written the three Critiques in reverse order.

13

Saul A. Kripke, Naming and Necessity (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1972).
Hartshorne also claims that natural laws are contingent. Like Whitehead, he accepts the idea of
different cosmic epochs in which laws might change. “What scientist can speak for eternity?”
15
Whitehead’s words are: “Kant followed Hume in this misconception; and was thus led to balance the
world upon thought—oblivious to the scanty supply of thinking.” Process and Reality, Corrected Edition, edited by
David Ray Griffin and Donald Sherburne (New York: Free Press, 1978): 151.
14
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*

*

*

CH: Leibniz was one of the first to show that the distinction between Spirit and Matter is
not very illuminating.
*

*

*

CH: My goal is to write the best philosophy of any octogenarian.
DV: There aren’t many philosophers who have lived into their eighties, much less written
philosophy then. Whitehead was fairly old when he began writing in philosophy.16
CH: Yes, but he did not live to be eighty. But I am not trying to be greater than
Whitehead.17
*

*

*

CH: I am as much a Peircean as a Whiteheadian. I learned as much from Peirce as I
learned from Whitehead.
*

*

*

CH: Do you know what Whitehead said when he got the letter from Harvard asking him
to come to the United States to teach philosophy? He said to his wife, “I’ve always wanted to
teach philosophy.” Isn’t that a marvelously beautiful story?
*

*

*

DV: You mention Teilhard de Chardin only once in Creative Synthesis. Would you
comment on this?18

16

I would have been more accurate to have said that Whitehead was fairly old when he began writing
about speculative philosophy or metaphysics.
17
I may have misremembered the first sentence, but I’m sure Hartshorne said that he wasn’t trying to be
greater than Whitehead. Whitehead lived to the age of 86.
18
I read a great deal of Teilhard when I was an undergraduate. In Crosby’s philosophy of religion class I
asked to write a paper on Teilhard and process thought. Crosby averred that Teilhard wasn’t really a process
thinker because he conceived the ultimate as timeless. Crosby suggested that I read Whitehead instead. That set
me on a thirty year path of reading Whitehead and Hartshorne. Only in 2005 did I again begin to read Teilhard, but
now with the background of understanding process philosophy. I’ve published three articles on Teilhard since that
time: “Teilhard, Medawar, and the New Atheism: Between Science and Metaphysics,” From Teilhard to Omega:
Co-creating an Unfinished Universe, Ilia Delio, ed. (Maryknoll, New York: Orbis, 2014): 135-156; “Teilhard: Le
Philosophe Malgré l’Église,” in Rediscovering Teilhard’s Fire, Kathleen Duffy, SSJ, ed. (Philadelphia, Pennsylvania:
St. Joseph University Press, 2010): 69-88; “Teilhard de Chardin and Process Philosophy Redux,” Process Studies 35,
1 (Spring-Summer 2006): 12-42. It took me that long to correct Crosby.
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CH: There is a good deal to agree with in Teilhard. But he is much too muddled. His
main importance is in opening the eyes of many Roman Catholics, who might otherwise have
remained within the Thomistic tradition, to the idea of a growing God.
*

*

*

[The school newspaper ran an article on Hartshorne the Friday before he arrived in Norman. The
article mentioned several of Hartshorne’s books, but spelled The Divine Relativity as “The
Divine Reality.” I had not noticed the misprint when I showed the article to Hartshorne.]
CH: There is only one mistake in this article. [Pointing to the typographical error] Any
number of authors have talked about the divine reality. How many have seriously considered the
divine relativity?

*

*

*

DV: There is actually quite a bit in Nietzsche which anticipates process philosophy.
Nietzsche’s rejection of substance and his doctrine of the will-to-power I see echoed in
Whitehead’s concept of concrescence.
CH: This is true. But Nietzsche ruined his insight with the eternal recurrence. The will-topower is a celebration of creative activity. The eternal recurrence says there is nothing new under
the sun. Nietzsche did not fully understand the cumulative nature of process. Each new reality

11

which becomes includes its predecessors. There could never be mere repetition in a
Whiteheadian universe.
*

*

*

DV: Can there be any overlap between the physicist’s concept of time and the concept of
time when applied to God?
CH: Relativity physics seems to pose a problem for neoclassical metaphysics. [Paul]
Fitzgerald has written an article in Process Studies cataloguing the options open to a process
theist. I think Fitzgerald may think relativity theory gives us the final word about time. I have a
good friend in physics who said that our sole means of measuring time and distance is ultimately
dependent on light signals. If there is a divine simultaneity it is something we could not make use
of in physics. Also, there must be something like time between big bang explosions. What is a
physicist going to do with that?
*

*

*

CH: Kant rightly saw that the cosmological argument depends on the ontological
argument. What he didn’t see was that the ontological argument is dependent on the
cosmological argument.
*

*

*

[The following two excerpts are from a discussion with Dr. Hartshorne which followed a service
at the First Unitarian Church of Oklahoma City where he preached a sermon titled, “Taking
Freedom Seriously” on February 22, 1981.19]
Questioner (a man): In Mortimer Adler’s book How to Think About God, he speaks of the
idea of God as the uncaused cause.20 How does this relate to your own views?
CH: The idea of an uncaused cause is a perfect example of a half-truth parading as the
whole truth. A God who loves and is loved by his creatures is anything but unmoved. It is true
that God’s existence is uncaused, but this does not mean God is in all respects uncaused.
*

19

*

*

Hartshorne later presented the same presentation as a Lowell Lecture in 1983, Cambridge Forum,
taped lecture # 471 (June 25, 1983) (3 Church Street, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 02138).
20
Mortimer J. Adler, How to Think About God: A Guide for the 20th Century Pagan (New York: Macmillan,
1980). For Hartshorne’s discussion of Adler’s philosophy, see Hartshorne, Creativity in American Philosophy
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 1984), chapter 20.
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Questioner (a woman): I can agree with everything you’ve said about freedom. But why
bother with God?
CH: That is a fair question. Without God, life cannot be significant. No one can live as if
God did not exist. The purpose of life is to contribute to future actualities.
Woman: Yes, but we can contribute to society.
CH: Like all things non-divine, societies are not immortal. They perish. But we live as if
our lives mattered. Only God can guarantee the significance of our lives. As the Jewish saying
goes, “He endows our days with abiding significance.”

Charles Hartshorne, February 23, 1981
Norman, Oklahoma
(Photo by Don Viney)

Charles Hartshorne, February 23, 1981
Norman, Oklahoma
(Photo by Don Viney)

Charles Hartshorne and Don Viney
February 23, 1981, Norman, Oklahoma
(Photo by Jerry Klingaman)

Charles Hartshorne and Don Viney
February 24, 1981, Norman, Oklahoma
(Photo by Robert Shahan)
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Charles Hartshorne
February 21, 1981, Moore, Oklahoma
(Photo by Don Viney)

Charles Hartshorne and J. N. Mohanty
February 24, 1981, Norman, Oklahoma
(Photo by Don Viney)

November 1981: I saw Hartshorne briefly at a philosophy conference in San Marcos,
Texas.
December 1981: My father, Wayne Viney, invited me to accompany him to Harvard
University and to pay my way! Dad was doing research on Dorothea Dix (1802-1887).21 At
Harvard I obtained a photocopy of Hartshorne’s dissertation, An Outline and Defense of the
Argument for the Unity of Being in the Absolute or Divine Good (May 1923). This would form
the basis of the second chapter of my dissertation.

21

My father’s publications on Dix include: “Dorothea Dix,” Dictionary of Unitarian Universalist Biography
(2003), http://www.uua.org/uuhs/duub/articles/DorotheaDix.html; “Dorothea Lynde Dix,” Encyclopedia of
Psychology, vol. 3, edited by Alan E. Kazdin (Oxford University Press and the American Psychological Association,
2000): 65-66; “Dorothea Lynde Dix: An Intellectual Conscience for Psychology,” Portraits of Pioneers in Psychology
II, edited by Gregory Kimble, C. Alan Boneau, and Michael Wertheimer (Washington, D.C.: American Psychological
Association, 1996): 15-31 [also printed in The General Psychologist 31/2 (Summer 1995): 37-48]; “Dorothea Lynde
Dix: Positive or Negative Influence on the Development of Treatment for the Mental Ill,” co-authored with Karen
Bartsch, The Social Sciences Journal 21 (1984): 71-82; “Dorothea Dix and the History of Psychology,” co-authored
with Steven Zorich, Psychological Reports 50 (1982): 211-218.
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February 1981 – April 1982: Correspondence with Hartshorne concerning my
dissertation. I would send Hartshorne a chapter and he would respond with suggested revisions.22
He was always prompt and supportive. I shared Hartshorne’s letters with my dissertation advisor,
Tom Boyd. On September 9, 1981, I received the following memo from Tom: “What can I say?
If Hartshorne be for you, who can be against you? Well argued—cogent. What I will await is the
remainder to determine how well you sustain the argument. (Note occasional corrections with
check in margins.) See you this afternoon!” When it came time for my oral defense, Hartshorne
was unable to attend, but he sent a letter of support on my behalf.
January 1983: J. Clayton Feaver (1911-1995), who had taught a course on Tillich, which
I took, asked me what I was doing with the dissertation. I mentioned my unsuccessful attempt to
publish a chapter from the work (on the moral argument) in the American Journal of Theology
and Philosophy—the rejection notice arrived in November 1982. Feaver asked, “Why don’t you
publish it?” I have often wondered why I didn’t think of that. Hartshorne agreed to write the
foreword to the book and suggested State University of New York Press as a possible publisher.
Talks with Charles Hartshorne in Atlanta, Georgia at a meeting of the Southern Society of
Philosophy and Psychology. Notes written between April 1-2, 1983 by Don Viney.
My father suggested that we find a conference that would be of mutual interest and that
we could attend together. We found that the Southern Society of Philosophy and Psychology was
meeting in Atlanta, so we arranged to meet there. I did not realize that Hartshorne would be at
the conference, but as it turned out, the meeting with him was fortuitous. The following are my
recollections from a conversation during breakfast on April 1, 1983 (Friday) that Wayne Viney
and I had with Hartshorne.
Hartshorne said that he had been in the hospital because of an old ulcer that had flared up.
Apparently a couple of women had suggested that he write a book for the non-philosopher on his
thought. Before he knew it, he was writing the book. Before long it was finished, titled
Omnipotence and Other Theological Mistakes. However, writing the book had put such a strain
on his body that he soon found himself in the hospital. He was given a blood transfusion and he
told us that it is the closest thing to an actual miracle that modern medicine has to offer. Before
the transfusion he felt tired and lethargic; afterwards his vitality had reappeared.
Hartshorne’s vitality and strength is truly remarkable. He is eighty-five years old. Yet his
mind is as clear as any could be. I noticed that when we climbed the stairs to the lounge to eat
breakfast, he did not hang on to the rail for support. This kind of strength for a man his age
22

I edited and published my correspondence with Hartshorne concerning the dissertation, as well as all of
my later correspondence with him, as Charles Hartshorne’s Letters to a Young Philosopher: 1979-1995. Special
issue of Logos-Sophia, The Journal of the Pittsburg State University Philosophical Society 11 (Fall 2001).
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probably comes from the fact that in all of his years he has never owned an automobile. His
personal mode of transportation has always been a bicycle or walking.
Since I am currently trying to publish my dissertation (written on Hartshorne’s Global
Argument for God’s Existence) I asked him which of his six theistic proofs he viewed as most
compelling. The two most compelling arguments, to his own mind, he said, are the argument
from order and the idea of objective immortality. In the first, the simplest and most satisfactory
explanation of the order in the universe is that there is a divine ordering power. Hartshorne
agreed that the argument is based on analogy with human ordering. This brought to my mind the
passage in Thomas Aquinas’s writings where he uses the example of a group of soldiers being
called into order by a commander. The second argument, from Objective Immortality, is that
only God’s memory satisfactorily accounts for the preservation of past value. I think what
Hartshorne had in mind is what he refers to as the Moral Argument for God’s existence.
Hartshorne sees his most original contribution to the global argument as the aesthetic
argument—God’s nonexistence would be an irremediably ugly fact. But regrettable (evil) facts
cannot be eternal. To regret that X is not the case is to imply that X could be the case. But if God
does not exist, he could not exist. On the other hand, if God does exist, his existence is eternal.
Therefore, God must exist. It would make no sense to regret an eternal truth. I imagined after our
conversation what the atheistic response would be: since nothing necessary can be regrettable,
God’s existence, if he does not exist, cannot be regrettable. Hartshorne would probably reply that
necessities are not only not regrettable, they must be positively desirable. This, God’s
nonexistence cannot be. I believe there is more than a little appeal to the viscera in Hartshorne’s
argument. Perhaps this is one of the chief advantages of theism over atheism.
*

*

*

On the evening of April 1st, Hartshorne and Donald Sherburne stayed long after the banquet
exchanging clever witticisms and anecdotes of famous persons. Hartshorne did most of the
talking.
CH: Modesty is the one virtue you can’t boast about.
*

*

*

CH: Either during or after the editing of the Peirce papers, I had a dream in which I was
talking to Charles Peirce. Said Peirce, “What do you know about me? Why are you editing my
work?”
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Hartshorne admitted that there might have been others, more acquainted with math and
logic, better qualified to do the job.23
The idea of numbering the paragraphs of the Peirce papers was suggested by Paul Weiss
[Hartshorne’s co-editor] after he had seen the same thing done in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus.24
Hartshorne told a story about Weiss. Someone once asked Weiss if he ever philosophized
in his dreams. “No,” he replied, “but sometimes when I philosophize I worry that I’m dreaming.”
*

*

*

Hartshorne also told a story which beautifully illustrates A. O. Lovejoy’s careful mind.
Once when Lovejoy was being considered for an academic position, an interviewer asked him
quite directly, “Do you believe in God?” Lovejoy asked to have a couple of minutes to think
about the question. When he returned he had in his hand a list of about twelve or fifteen meaning
of “God” and asked the questioner, “Which of these meaning of ‘God’ did you have in mind?”25
*

*

*

On April 2nd, Dad and I were discussing when to leave for the airport—whether on an
earlier or later shuttle bus. As chance would have it, Hartshorne was waiting in the hotel lobby
for the earlier shuttle. Dad and I decided to accompany Professor Hartshorne and eat lunch at the
airport rather than the hotel.
Dad and Hartshorne exchanged stories, anecdotes, and quotations from Eliseo Vivas,
William James, Sigmund Freud, and Gustav Fechner en route to the airport. The focus on
psychologists made sense because my father is a psychologist and Hartshorne’s first book was on
the psychology of sensation. In all of this, my father proved time and again to be a model of
gracious magnanimity. Dad favors a rather modest determinism whereas Hartshorne is wellknown for his (sometimes vitriolic) attacks on determinism. However, I could only be impressed
by the fact that Hartshorne’s own ideas are often more deterministic than my father’s. For

23

Here is Hartshorne’s published anecdote about the dream: People have sometimes asked me if I had
met Peirce. I have said, “Yes, once. I was introduced to him as the man who was editing his writings. He looked at
me with disapproval and said coldly, ‘What makes you think you are competent to edit my writings when you don’t
know science and mathematics?’” This, of course, was a dream (Peirce died when I was seventeen years old)—one
from which awoke a chastened man. “Charles Hartshorne’s Recollections of Editing the Peirce Papers” [an
Interview with Irwin C. Lieb]. Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 6, 3-4 (1970): 149-159 (anecdote on page
159).
24
Hartshorne’s memory of whose idea it was to number the paragraphs was unclear. However, Weiss
confirmed it was his (Weiss’s) idea and Hartshorne said that, for him, that settled the matter. Hartshorne, The
Darkness and the Light: A Philosopher Reflects Upon His Fortunate Career and Those Who Made it Possible (Albany:
State University of New York Press, 1990): 175.
25
For Hartshorne’s published version of this anecdote, which is much clearer than my remembered
version, see Hartshorne, The Darkness and the Light: 320.
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example, only yesterday Hartshorne claimed that music would always be greater and more
influential than the visual arts—specifically, composers would always be more popular than
painters. Hartshorne explained by saying that at a biological level, a painting in a gallery has far
less effect on the human organism than the sound of a symphony. Presumably he meant to say
that the sound of the symphony is louder to the ear than the light from a painting is bright to the
eyes. Dad later told me that this bothered him. Shouldn’t it be possible for anyone to be as great
as anyone else? I told Dad he seemed to be denying his determinism and Hartshorne his
indeterminism. In any case, Hartshorne’s theory seems to me rather too simple. Greatness is
much more complex than that. How to decide who is seen as greater or more influential,
Beethoven or Da Vinci? Probably there are more reproductions of the Last Supper in the homes
of Americans than there are albums of the Fifth Symphony.26
Hartshorne’s plane was leaving from the same concourse as my father’s, making it
convenient to see the old philosopher to his terminal. Hartshorne commented that he had had a
most proper escort. “No,” I said, “it is we who have had the proper escort.” Hartshorne was
flattered and looked at my father and said, “I think he’ll do alright in the world.” Hartshorne had
earlier expressed concern about whether I had found a job. (See August 1984.)
We said our good-byes and Hartshorne gave us his quaint farewell nod and smile. I
escorted Dad to his terminal, saw his plane off, and went to my own terminal gate.
I could not help reflecting that I had just left the two most important influences on my
own thinking. These two men, more than any others, had shaped my thought into what it is
today. I will never escape their influence. Nor would I want to. Both have a healthy attitude
towards life. Indeed, I suspect that this is one of the chief reasons for Hartshorne’s longevity. My
father has shaped me emotionally. My beliefs are colored by his values. This is why I will never
have a problem with using masculine pronouns for God.27 This is not to say I have problems
using feminine pronouns for God—quite the contrary. As to Hartshorne, I accept the better part
of his metaphysics. Sometimes one plays a sort of mental game in which one wonders who, in all
of history, one would most like to spend a meal with. For me, the answer is easy. And it is more
than a day dream. I have had the privilege of Charles Hartshorne’s company.
*
26

*

*

Today (2014) I would emphasize the role of repeated exposure to a work of art or of music as a factor in
its perceived greatness or influence.
27
My view on this changed. Sometime after my book on Hartshorne’s theistic arguments was published, I
began using inclusive language. Hartshorne, as usual, was ahead of me. He quite self-consciously used inclusive
language in Omnipotence and Other Theological Mistakes and explicitly addressed the question of sexist language.
Would that I had paid more attention to his example and his arguments. I was finally swayed on my views on sexist
language when in March of 1985 I read Rosemary Ruether’s Sexism and God-Talk (Boston: Beacon Press, 1983) and
met her when she visited Pittsburg, Kansas.
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Although this was the only time that Hartshorne met my father, it is not a meeting that the
philosopher forgot. In December 1985, he wrote to me asking if he thought my father would be
interested in a writing an essay on Hartshorne’s first book, The Philosophy and Psychology of
Sensation (1934) for the Library of Living Philosophers volume that was in preparation. Dad
wrote the article and Hartshorne was pleased with it.28

Wayne Viney and Charles Hartshorne
April 2, 1983, Atlanta, Georgia

Don Viney and Charles Hartshorne
April 2, 1983, Atlanta, Georgia

May – October 1983: In May, I received unofficial word from SUNY that they would
publish my dissertation. In August Hartshorne’s Foreword arrived in the mail. About that time,
SUNY gave me official word that they would publish the book, but only on the condition that
Hartshorne’s foreword not be included. At this time no one at SUNY had seen the foreword. I
sent the foreword to SUNY and appealed to them to reconsider. In October they reversed their
decision.
Talks with Charles Hartshorne in Lincoln, Nebraska, April 13-14, 1984, at a Research
Conference in the Philosophy of Religion.29
April 13, 1984: It is a year since I have seen Charles Hartshorne. Our last meeting was in
Atlanta, Georgia in April 1983. Happily, the eighty-seven year old philosopher is as spry and
intellectually aware as ever. His greeting was cordial and familiar. He said he wondered if he
28

Wayne Viney, “Charles Hartshorne’s Philosophy and Psychology of Sensation,” The Philosophy of
Charles Hartshorne, edited by Lewis Edwin Hahn (La Salle, Illinois: Open Court, 1991): 91-112. In the same volume,
see Hartshorne’s comments: 598-600.
29
The papers from the conference were published in Robert Audi and William J. Wainwright (eds.)
Rationality, Religious Belief, & Moral Commitment: New Essays in the Philosophy of Religion (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1986).
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would see me at the conference. He also asked how my father is doing. It was a pleasant surprise
to see that he remembered by father.
There are many well-known philosophers at the conference—William Alston, George
Mavrodes, Stephen Davis, James Ross, Nelson Pike, Marilyn and Robert Adams, William Rowe,
Alvin Plantinga, Robert Audi—but the only other philosopher of Hartshorne’s age and notoriety
who is here is William Frankena, the great pioneer of classifying ethical theories. I overhead
Frankena talking to someone about his (Frankena’s) lunch with Hartshorne. Frankena marveled
at how someone ten years his senior could be so vital. Frankena was born in 1908 and would die
in 1994.
Much of the conference is centered on questions surrounding evidentialism,
foundationalism, and proper basicality. All of this, of course, stems from the work of Alvin
Plantinga, William Alston, Nicholas Wolterstorff, and George Mavrodes (all of whom are
present) who claim that belief in God can be properly basic; that is, one can be rational, within
one’s epistemic rights, or what have you, in believing in God though one’s belief is not based on
other beliefs.30 This is in response to the co-called evidentialist challenge (Bertrand Russell,
Antony Flew, Michael Scriven, et al.) which demands evidence for God’s existence before the
belief in God can be considered rational.
I think that Plantinga’s line of thinking is foreign to Hartshorne. Hartshorne told me that
he has not made his peace with either foundationalism or evidentialism. Said Hartshorne, “If I
disagree with the atheist, then one of us has a false belief. Natural theology can be of some use in
deciding which of us has the false belief. I prefer to exhaust the logically possible alternatives to
theism and show that theism is the most reasonable. I don’t know that anyone approaches the
theistic question in quite the way I do. Of course, my approach only works for the relatively
abstract proposition that God exists. To evaluate the specific claims of each religion—such as
Jesus rising from the dead—it is more fruitful to see what the various religions have to say.”
A persistent complaint of Hartshorne is that philosophers too readily ignore the study of
the history of philosophy or fail to learn the lessons it has to teach. In a conversation with
Mavrodes he said that he always did philosophy as if he were in dialogue with the great
philosophers of the past such as Leibniz and Aristotle. (Hartshorne’s Insights and Oversights of
Great Thinkers is a good example of what Hartshorne has in mind.) Mavrodes mentioned the
example of Wittgenstein as someone who was great yet who had a minimal understanding of the

30

Alvin Plantinga and Nicholas Wolterstorff (eds.) Faith and Rationality: Reason and Belief in God
(University of Notre Dame Press, 1983). This book contains essays by, among others, Plantinga, Alston,
Wolterstorff, and Mavrodes. During the summer 1986 I attended a six week NEH sponsored Chautauqua
conference in Bellingham, Washington that was led by Plantinga and Alston.
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history of philosophy. Hartshorne made it quite clear that he faulted Wittgenstein on this
account. Wittgenstein could have been greater had he known more about philosophy’s past.
Hartshorne’s displeasure with the ignorance and neglect of the past was nowhere more
apparent than when he was asked to chair a session in which William Rowe was to give a paper
on the empirical argument from evil against theism. Hartshorne saw to it that someone took his
place as chair during the discussion period so that he could comment on Rowe’s paper. The
comment was, predictably, that Rowe’s argument presupposed that the theistic question could be
settled empirically, a contention Hartshorne has long denied. Just as Hartshorne does philosophy
by carrying on a dialogue with philosopher of the past, so, I had the impression, he expects
nothing less from others. And here was Rowe, a well-respected philosopher of religion,
developing his argument in an intellectual vacuum. What made matters all the more irritating to
Hartshorne, I am sure, is that the one who Rowe should have been in dialogue with was sitting in
the same room listening to him. It is like someone arguing about how many epicycles are needed
to account for the motions of the planets while Kepler sit in the room listening. Rowe kindly
deferred to Hartshorne by saying that Hartshorne’s Omnipotence and Other Theological
Mistakes was sitting on his office desk and that he intended to read it upon his return.
A couple of interesting comments came up in the conversation between Mavrodes and
Hartshorne. Hartshorne said he thought that it is safer to overlook Kant than to overlook Leibniz.
This is due in large measure to Leibniz’s insight into the nature of matter. Unlike other
philosophers, Leibniz did not commit the fallacy of division by supposing that the parts
constitutive of material objects lack sentience because the objects considered as a whole do; for
example, there is no feeling in a rock because the rock does not feel. Hartshorne would accuse
most modern day materialists of committing this fallacy. Hartshorne has argued at great length
for the psychicalist view of matter which says that every genuine individual has feeling. A rock
is not a genuine individual but a special kind of collection of individuals (Whitehead called it a
society), the members of which feel.
Hartshorne took up the relation between God and the world. He holds that if the creature
is in pain and if God is all-inclusive, then God must, in some measure suffer also. However, this
does not mean that if the creature is wicked God is, in some degree wicked. The reason is
because wickedness is an act of will in a way that the experience of pain is not. Mavrodes asked
Hartshorne if, when someone is drunk, God would thereby, in some degree, be inebriated. Of
course, Hartshorne denied this, although for reasons that were not clear to me.31

31

Hartshorne is a panentheist who holds that God includes the universe but is not identical with it.
Without a particular location within the universe, God has no need of specialized perceptual organs but
“prehends” every actual entity immediately. For this reason, Hartshorne argues that God knows how each
individual feels without feeling as they feel. See Hartshorne, Creativity in American Philosophy (Albany: State
University of New York Press, 1984): 199.
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April 14, 1984: This morning Greg Bassham (with whom I was attending the conference)
and I went to breakfast with Hartshorne. As usual, chatting with Hartshorne was delightful. The
conversation was sprinkled with anecdotes and philosophical reflections. He told us about the
editing of the Peirce papers and the dream he had of meeting Peirce. A bearded Peirce greeted
Hartshorne with the question, “what makes you think you know enough about my work to edit
these papers?” (See note 23 above.)
Hartshorne worked with Paul Weiss on the Peirce project. As it was, Hartshorne was the
third person the Harvard philosophy department had tried to hire to do the project. One of the
persons was an alcoholic and ended up in jail; the other, I believe, Hartshorne said died.
Hartshorne took the project and was later joined by Weiss. Neither philosopher expected this
work to be their entrance to fame. Both were already doing their own work. Hartshorne had
come to most of his views by 1923. Weiss was less clear about his philosophy at the time. The
Peirce papers were edited between 1925 and 1928.
It was at this time that Hartshorne became Whitehead’s assistant. Being curious about the
relations between their philosophies, I asked Hartshorne if Whitehead had read any of his
material on the ontological argument. Hartshorne said he only knew that Whitehead had read his
book on sensation, The Philosophy and Psychology of Sensation (1934) and the essay “The
Compound Individual” (1936). Neither of these works takes up the ontological argument. It later
occurred to me that Whitehead died in 1947 and that Hartshorne’s development of the
ontological argument in published form only began with Man’s Vision of God (1941) and with
“The Formal Validity and Real Significance of the Ontological Argument” published in the
Philosophical Review for 1944. Hartshorne’s most well-known defenses of the argument came
only after Whitehead was gone.
I told Hartshorne that I had been toying with the idea that ontological argument is the
watershed that divides his and Whitehead’s philosophy. The difference lies in Whitehead’s
distinction between real potentiality and general potentiality. Since Whitehead makes this
distinction (and it seems crucial for his doctrine of eternal objects) he would have trouble
accepting the ontological argument. Hartshorne can accept the argument only because he
believes that all modal concepts are traceable to the temporal advance.
Hartshorne wasn’t sure about my argument. He seemed to think that, although real
potentiality and general potentiality is a distinction Whitehead needs to make, Whitehead would
not have made an absolute break between the two modalities. If, as Whitehead claims, “the truth
itself is the way all things are together in the consequent Nature of God” then God’s nonexistence could not be part of the general potentiality inherent in the universe.32 Reflecting on the
32

Whitehead’s exact words are: “The truth itself is nothing else than how the composite natures of the
organic actualities of the world obtain adequate representation in the divine nature. Such representations
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problem later, it occurred to me that if, by truth, Whitehead was referring to what has occurred—
that is, what is Objectively Immortal—then Hartshorne’s counter-argument will not work. This is
something I will have to pursue in more depth.
Hartshorne noted that Plantinga told him that their versions of the ontological argument
are not so far removed. Yet, as I pointed out to Hartshorne, Plantinga’s ontological argument
relies on a very special concept of “possible worlds,” which is very far from what Hartshorne
means by a “possible world-state.” Hartshorne agreed and said that this had been his suspicion.
Possibility, he said, is always relative to an actually existing world. Thus, it is more accurate to
speak of possible world-states and possible worlds. Possibility always has its anchor on the shore
of actuality.33
Hartshorne said that he has four books in progress, one nearly complete. One of the
books is broadly autobiographical and tells about some of the people he has known.34 Because he
is so old and because he has traveled so widely throughout his life, he has met with many
philosophers, two of the most famous being Whitehead and Husserl. He said that he had read
Husserl’s Ideen (and some other work whose name I did not catch), as well as having been
invited to Husserl’s home and talking with the great phenomenologist. Hartshorne said that it
was probably his Harvard training that made him suspicious and rather unsympathetic to
Husserl’s project of divesting himself of presuppositions. The Cartesian project of finding an
original presuppositionless starting point is beyond human ability according to Hartshorne. He
said he did not understand how anyone, after having studied Husserl and Whitehead could
believe that Whitehead was not the greater genius.35
I related to Hartshorne how he had inadvertently offended my friend Peter Hutcheson
when he was at Southwest Texas State University in San Marco [now Texas State University]
and made some similarly nasty remark about Husserl. Peter, who knows Husserl’s work quite
well, was infuriated by something Hartshorne said. Peter wrote me that Hartshorne doesn’t know
much about Husserl. Hartshorne was delighted when I told him this story. “Philosophy,” he said,
“needs a little emotion to keep it lively.”

compose the ‘consequent nature’ of God, which evolves in its relationship to the evolving world without
derogation to the eternal completion of its primordial conceptual nature.” Whitehead, Process and Reality,
corrected edition, edited by David Ray Griffin and Donald Sherburne (New York: Free Press, 1978): 12-13.
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The autobiographical book is the previously cited The Darkness and the Light (1990).
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Hartshorne believes that one of the advantages of studying the history of philosophy is
that one can see the extreme positions taken on various issues and avoid them by taking a middle
ground. For example, Hume and Russell and others have held that all relations are external.
Spinoza and Blanshard hold the opposite extreme that all relations are internal. Hartshorne holds
that some relations are internal and some are external. The boy is internally related to the child
he once was but externally related to the man he is to become. Or again, is God wholly immanent
or wholly transcendent? Hartshorne’s neoclassical metaphysics attempts to show how and in
what sense God is both immanent and transcendent.
I told Hartshorne that one of the topics that is notable by its absence from his latest book,
Omnipotence and Other Theological Mistakes is the issue of faith and reason. Hartshorne agreed
and said that this is an area that demands more attention. I suggested that faith and reason might
be treated by finding the middle ground between extreme fideism and extreme rationalism.
Hartshorne seemed genuinely enthused by the suggestion. “Yes, I’ll have to do that. I’ll give you
credit for the idea.” I was flattered, although the idea didn’t seem all that original to me.
The conference was well represented by members of the organization called The Society
of Christian Philosophers. I asked Hartshorne if he considers himself a Christian. He did not
respond directly with a yes or no. He said that he believes that the great commandments to love
God with all of your heart, mind and soul and to love your neighbor as yourself (Mt 22:37-39)
express the essential truth in religion. However, he added that he does not believe in the divinity
of Jesus or that Jesus ought to be worshipped. Nor does he accept the idea of a personal career
after death or any kind of afterlife in which rewards and punishments are apportioned. “If you
can call that Christian,” he said, “then maybe I’m a Christian.”
Greg asked Hartshorne what he thought of John Hick’s criticism of the process
theodicy.36 Hick argues that process theology does not have an adequate response to the problem
of evil. The good life is lived only by a lucky élite. A great majority of humankind suffers the
common ills of hunger, disease, broken relationships, and unhappiness. The Process God seems
to be unable or unwilling to right these wrongs. Only an afterlife, with “rewards in heaven,” Hick
believes, can compensate for the tragedy of so much human existence.
Hartshorne at once admitted that he has personally been very fortunate and that much of
the human race has suffered unjustly. But he denied that an afterlife could solve the problem. If
there is freedom in the afterlife then there will be the same chance of suffering and tragedy that
we have here on earth. The idea that God could so arrange things to eliminate chance, even in an
afterlife, Hartshorne believes to be impossible.

36
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Hartshorne also argued that the concept of an indefinite extension of our earthly careers
beyond death is suspect. Our identity, he said, is defined by both spatial and temporal limits. It
belongs to God alone to be eternal and without limits. The Jains, he said, didn’t need God
because they believed that they all had the property of God, that is to say, the property of being
immortal. A fragment of the cosmos, such as a human being, could undergo only a finite number
of changes before becoming a different being. I pointed out that St. Paul speaks of acquiring a
new, transformed body at the resurrection. However, Paul seemed to have believed that we
remain the same person even after the transformation. Hartshorne acknowledge that his argument
does not prohibit a limited afterlife (a point I make in my book); but it does call into question the
possibility of an unlimited posthumous career.

Charles Hartshorne, George Mavrodes (bearded
man back of Hartshorne), and William Frankena (to
Hartshorne’s left)
April 13, 1984, Lincoln, Nebraska
(Photo by Don Viney)

William Alston, Robert M. Adams, Charles Hartshorne
April 14, 1984, Lincoln, Nebraska
(Photo by Don Viney)

After breakfast we attended the first paper of the day, “God, Creator of Kinds and
Possibilities: Requisent universalia ante res” by James Ross. Among other things, Ross argued
that possibility is always relative to a pre-existing state of affairs, that is to say, actuality is prior
to possibility. This is a position with which Hartshorne agrees. During the discussion of the
paper, Hartshorne provided the conference with its best entertainment. He prefaced his remarks
to Ross with the comment, “Your paper is well argued and, I think, mostly correct. This is the
second time I have heard you deliver such a fine paper. It has been some time since I heard the
other paper.” When the laughter subsided, Hartshorne asked Ross whether he believed that his
position entailed that God does not have knowledge of future free decisions. After Hartshorne
explained his question at some length, Ross replied, with as much wit as respect, “With your
commendation, I don’t want to risk saying something I may later regret.” When Hartshorne sat
down he turned to me and said, “He is a capable fellow.”
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August 1984: I begin work as an Assistant Professor at Pittsburg State University in
Pittsburg, Kansas. Hartshorne wrote a letter for me.
January 1985: The book version of my dissertation, Charles Hartshorne and the
Existence of God, is published. Hartshorne’s suggestion to write on the global argument was
inspired. My book received very positive reviews and it would remain, for many years to come,
the only published secondary account of Hartshorne’s reasons for belief in God. (George
Shields’ dissertation also addressed the issue, but was not published.)
Reflections on the St. Louis Conference on Process Theology, Friday and Saturday, march
22-23, 1985, St. Louis, Missouri.37 Notes by Don Viney, written March 27, 1985.
The Saint Louis conference on Process theology promised to provide stimulating
discussion on recent trends in philosophical theology. Appropriately, Charles Hartshorne was the
key-note speaker. He is now eighty-eight years old and must classify in anyone’s estimation as
one of the most important metaphysicians of our time. Indeed, he is the reason I made a special
effort to attend the conference. Apparently, others were similarly motivated. When Hartshorne
spoke, the conference room was packed with students and professors. No other paper was so well
attended. I was accompanied by Rebecca Main, my fiancée, and three students from my
Philosophy and Religion seminar, Joyce Bestor, Regina Kobak, and Debra Smith. As several of
our class sessions had been devoted to Hartshorne’s work (through my book), the conference
provided my students with a rare opportunity to meet the man behind the work.
Hartshorne did not disappoint his audience. He spoke in language that persons untrained
in philosophy or theology could understand. A fellow seated next to me furiously jotted down
notes while Hartshorne spoke. Every few minutes he would exclaim under his breath, “Oh, that’s
beautiful,” or “excellent,” or “yes, yes, yes!” Hartshorne, it seems, had made another fan.
Hartshorne’s wife, Dorothy, also made a hit at the conference. It was the first time I had
met Dorothy. She is as lively, spry, and witty as her husband. Before the talk began she helped
Charles write some tables illustrating various metaphysical viewpoints on the blackboard.
Shortly before Charles was to speak, one of them noticed that a letter was missing from one of
the tables. Dorothy jumped to her feet and corrected the oversight. As she was returning to her
seat she said, in a voice audible to all, “It’s a good thing I’m invisible.”
Dorothy played a vital role in her husband’s career, helping with his manuscripts and
compiling bibliographies. It is clear they are very close and dear to each other. One has the
impression that she watches over him to insure that others do not take advantage of his generous
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spirit and to insure that he gets a fair hearing. After one session Charles stood to comment on the
paper. As he spoke, Dorothy yelled form the back of the room, “Louder.” Charles obediently
walked to the podium and spoke into the microphone.38
I was surprised and disappointed to hear Dorothy say that she did not like the line
drawing of Charles on the cover of my book. She said she thought it made him look like he was
one-hundred and twenty years old. I kept my disagreement to myself and wondered what Charles
thought of it. Later, I related this story to Lewis Ford. He simply smiled and said, “Yes, but have
you seen Beth Neville’s drawing of Hartshorne?” I laughed, for I had seen the drawing.39
Not all of the papers were as clearly written and delivered as Hartshorne’s. In fact, with
the exception of a couple of papers, I was disappointed. Part of my disappointment is purely
personal. I had the opportunity to submit a paper to this conference and let it slip away. It is my
own fault. I did not feel I had a paper, or even an idea worthy of such a conference. I now see
that I was mistaken. The standard of excellence I set for myself was excessive. The papers were
not spectacular; and if I may say so without sounding mean-spirited, some of the papers were
unworthy of the conference. The reason is two-fold. First, the papers often spoke only to those
initiated into Whiteheadian jargon. Process philosophy has already spawned its own scholastics.
I believe that one of the values of process thought is its capacity to mediate opposing positions
and contribute to the discussion of a variety of philosophical issues. It can achieve this end only
by outgrowing its own neologisms and avoiding the philosophic narcissism of specialized
pedants. Second, the papers tended to caricaturize opposing positions, especially classical
theism. One of the participants fully admitted during the discussion period that his paper had
made a straw man of Thomas Aquinas. This fellow’s presentation was not uncommon in this
regard. Such uncritical scholarship is disappointing and unnecessary. Process Philosophy has
resources aplenty to combat its detractors without succumbing to such carelessness, not to say,
disrespect.40
38

Dorothy was as I have described. What I did not know at the time was that she was suffering the onset
of Alzheimer’s disease. She was a diligent proof-reader as one can see from reading her husband’s works. It is
clear, however, that she was unable to proof-read Wisdom as Moderation (Albany: State University of New York
Press, 1987) which is marred by many mistakes.
39
For Beth Neville’s drawing of Hartshorne see her husband’s book, Robert C. Neville, God the Creator: On
the Transcendence and the Presence of God (University of Chicago Press, 1968), p. 267.
40
Hartshorne’s longstanding disagreements with Thomists occasionally led to charges that he
misunderstood the Angelic Doctor. Hartshorne expressed some frustration in what he took to be the lack of clarity
in the replies of Thomists to his criticisms. See, for example, his reply to John Wild’s review of The Divine Relativity,
“The Divine Relativity and Absoluteness: A Reply,” The Review of Metaphysics 4/1 (Sept. 1950): 31-60, especially
page 47. Hartshorne provides a succinct statement on Thomas in his Aquinas Lecture at Marquette, Aquinas to
Whitehead: Seven Centuries of Metaphysics of Religion (Milwaukee: Marquette University Publications, 1976).
Hartshorne’s exchange with W. Norris Clarke is a must read for getting clear on Hartshorne’s disagreements with
Thomists. See Santiago Sia (ed.) Charles Hartshorne’s Concept of God: Philosophical and Theological Responses
(Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1990): Clarke, “Charles Hartshorne’s Philosophy of God: a Thomistic
Critique”: 103-123; Hartshorne, “Clarke’s Thomistic Critique”: 267-279.
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Dorothy and Charles Hartshorne at the blackboard
March 22, 1985, St. Louis, Missouri
(Photo by Don Viney)

Lewis Ford and Charles Hartshorne
March 23, 1985, St. Louis, Missouri
(Photo by Don Viney)

Dorothy and Charles Hartshorne
March 23, 1985, St. Louis, Missouri
(Photo by Don Viney)

Dorothy Hartshorne
March 23, 1985, St. Louis, Missouri
(Photo by Don Viney)

Regina Kobak and Charles Hartshorne
March 23, 1985
(Photo by Don Viney)

Rebecca Main and Charles Hartshorne
March 23, 1985
(Photo by Don Viney)

I do not mean to be offering sour grapes. As a whole, the conference was worthwhile.
Lewis Ford’s paper on the origin of subjectivity was impressive. He is one of process
philosophy’s brighter lights. Also, it was encouraging to see Hartshorne’s accomplishments
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appreciated. When introducing Hartshorne, Professor Leonard Eslick said simply, “There have
been three great metaphysicians in this century. Bergson was one. Whitehead was another. And
we are privileged to have the other in our midst—Charles Hartshorne.” In his paper, David Tracy
focused on what he considers Hartshorne’s two great contributions to philosophy. First is that
Hartshorne has shown that the theistic question is not so much a question of fact as of meaning.
God is either necessary and thus essential to the very fabric of existence or God is impossible
and thus does not even possess the consolation of being conceivable. Second, Hartshorne is the
one who discovered (not rediscovered) the distinction between existence and actuality. It is the
distinction for which Hartshorne has said that he hopes he will be remembered. The existence
and actuality distinction is the cornerstone of dipolar theism. In my view this distinction is what
keeps Hartshorne’s philosophy from collapsing into a kind of Taoist or atheistic view of the
interaction of opposites.41
My estimation of Hartshorne’s significance is admittedly one-sided. It is no secret that I
admire his achievements. My book on Hartshorne has been criticized for being too supportive of
neoclassical metaphysics. There is some justice in the remark. Becky Main told Hartshorne that
he was one of my favorite people. Hartshorne replied, “He is one of my favorite persons too. He
is one of my discoveries.” Hartshorne always had my respect, but how could I help but like him
after such compliments?
My intellectual development cannot be understood apart from Hartshorne’s influence. As
I told him, he saved me from atheism. He seemed surprised and pleased by the remark. Then he
added, “You are not the first, you know.” At a time in my life when the intellectual respectability
of theism was in doubt, Hartshorne’s thought showed me that belief in God, when properly
formulated, puts atheisms (and many forms of theism) to shame. It also seems to me that if one is
going to construct a metaphysic, as Hartshorne does, one will eventually find that deity is
indispensible. Is it an accident that almost all metaphysicians of first-rate importance were
theists? This is no argument for theism. But it puts to rest the fairytale that belief in God is a relic
of past superstitions.42 A banquet was held on the evening of the first day. The banquet was, in
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Tracy called the distinction “Hartshorne’s Discovery.” See David Tracy, “Analogy, Metaphor and God
Language: Charles Hartshorne,” The Modern Schoolman 62/4 (May 1985): 259. Hartshorne wrote, “I rather hope to
be remembered for this distinction.” See Hartshorne’s response to R. M. Martin in Existence and Actuality:
Conversations with Charles Hartshorne, John B. Cobb, Jr. and Franklin I. Gamwell (eds.) (University of Chicago
Press, 1984): 75.
42
In the many years since the Saint Louis conference took place, the opinions I expressed in this
paragraph have not changed much. I wouldn’t be so strident, but I continue to marvel at the appallingly bad
reasoning of much modern day atheism, especially from the movement known as “the new atheism.” It is possible
to make a respectable philosophical case for atheism—a task at which the new atheists fail—but only if one has
bothered to address in an honest way the best that theism has to offer, and this cannot exclude the work of
Charles Hartshorne. My most thorough published response to the new atheists is: “How Not to be an Atheist: A
Neoclassical Response to the New Atheism.” Concrescence: the Australasian Association of Process Thought
(2008): 7-22. www.concrescence.org.
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part, a celebration of the career of Professor Eslick, who was retiring. Eslick gave a paper after
we ate. Hartshorne introduced his former student saying, “When I first met Leonard, I knew he
was a remarkable young man. As the years have passed, he has grown even more remarkable.”
Hartshorne did not say what it was about Eslick that he found remarkable. Certainly Eslick’s
scholarship is beyond criticism. However, his paper was a ponderous and protracted examination
of the problem of divine causality in process metaphysics employing many Whiteheadian terms.
Moreover, he spoke in a monotone and made no eye contact with the audience. The lights in the
room were low and midway through the presentation more than half of those in the room were
nodding off. The single time Eslick looked up, he caught the Hartshornes napping. Dorothy’s
forehead rested her folded arms on the table; Charles’ mouth was agape and his head was
beginning to role backwards, apparently full of negative prehensions and simple physical
feelings. Undaunted, Eslick continued to expound on the intricacies of the Whiteheadian
metaphysics of causality. When Eslick finished, a priest said a closing prayer, thanking God for
an intellectually stimulating evening. It is a shame the stimulation passed unnoticed. After the
banquet, Hartshorne asked me what I thought of the paper. I confessed to not being able to
follow it very closely. “Yes,” replied Hartshorne, “it was a bit much to digest after such a heavy
meal.”
I came away from the conference feeling refreshed, emotionally and intellectually. Much
of what was said was familiar to me. However, there were new insights. For example,
Hartshorne, commenting on Dan Dombrowski’s paper, noted that Leibniz attempted to make
sense of a being with all possible value.43 What Leibniz showed was that relatively abstract
values like knowledge, power, and love are compatible. Leibniz did not show that concrete
realizations of value are all compatible. Kant criticized Leibniz on this for the right reasons.
According to Hartshorne, it is the best thing Kant has to say about classical theism. But Kant
only saw this as a failure to prove classical theism, not as its disproof. In this, Kant did not go far
enough.
Another new insight for me concerned the doctrine of creation ex nihilo. Stanley Harrison
raised the question during the panel discussion of why process thinkers believe that creation ex
nihilo implies determinism. This is a question with which I have struggled ever since reading
David Griffin’s “Creation Out of Chaos and the Problem of Evil” in Stephen Davis’
Encountering Evil.44 Lewis Ford replied to Harrison by noting that Whitehead’s theism was
developed within the framework of an event ontology. Granting an ontology of events, God
cannot create the event ex nihilo without depriving it of its own creative activity. One who holds
to a substance ontology may conceive of the creation of a substance ex nihilo while apparently
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Dombrowski and I first met at this conference. We have fairly closely followed each other’s careers
since that time, sometimes contributing papers to the same conferences and books.
44
Stephen T. Davis (ed.) Encountering Evil: Live Options in Theodicy (Atlanta: John Knox Press, 1981). The
book was republished, updated and expanded, in 2001.
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preserving its freedom. God may create a substance ex nihilo which has the quality of being free.
But an event, whose every essence is in its activity, cannot be brought into being out of nothing
without depriving the event of its own internal activity.45
It was good to see Professor Hartshorne once again and especially nice to meet Dorothy.
Despite their ages they are alert, lucid and witty. Charles continues to struggle with the problems
his philosophy faces. One of these problems is how the non-absoluteness of time in relativity
theory squares with his theory of a divine time. For awhile it seemed that Hartshorne was
attracted to Henry Stapp’s revised Whiteheadianism which postulates a single cosmic time-line
(see my book, p. 137). Commenting on this at the conference Hartshorne said, “I’m not sure that
it really could be true.” He remains perplexed by this vexing problem. Hartshorne’s continuing
struggle with his own metaphysics is a model all philosophers would be well-advised to emulate.
December 22, 1985: Hartshorne hints in a letter that he would like my father to write the
essay on The Philosophy and Psychology of Sensation (1934) for the Library of Living
Philosophers (LLP) volume on Hartshorne’s thought that was in preparation. I put the proposal
to my father who read the book and wrote the essay. (See note 28.)
April 1987: For a second time I took students to see Hartshorne. Tony Graybosch at
Central State University in Edmond, Oklahoma found out I was at Pittsburg State University and
invited me to hear Hartshorne speak.46

45

I agree with Ford, but I now hold that the doctrine of creation ex nihilo is too often confused with the
idea that the past is finite, a confusion to which Thomas did not succumb but to which Hartshorne occasionally did.
Creation ex nihilo requires that (a) God had the option of creating a temporally finite or a temporally infinite
universe, (b) God’s act of creating the universe has no temporal location, and (c) the universe that is the object of
God’s creation is the entire sweep of space-time and all, besides God, that is not in space-time. This entails that the
decisions of the creatures, being part of creation, are created by God. Creation ex nihilo has precisely the
implication that Hartshorne says that it does, for it means that God makes the decisions of the creatures. Thomas
understood this and tried to escape the problem that it poses by maintaining that there are two sufficient
explanations for a free act, the activity of God and the activity of the person making the supposedly free decision.
My view, following Hartshorne, is that this is philosophical double-talk. See Donald W. Viney, “The Varieties of
Theism and the Openness of God: Charles Hartshorne and Free-Will Theism,” The Personalist Forum 14/2 (Fall
1998): 199-238 (see especially pp. 214-225).
46
Hartshorne gave me a copy of the paper he presented, titled, “God as Composer-Director, Enjoyer, and,
in a Sense, Player of the Cosmic Drama.” I eventually saw to the publication of the paper in Process Studies 30/2
(Fall-Winter 2001): 242-253. Dr. Graybosch gave me a video tape of the proceedings in Edmond so I was able to
transcribe the audience discussion of Hartshorne’s paper, published in the same issue of Process Studies: 254-260.
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Charles Hartshorne and Tony Graybosch
April 7, 1987, Edmond, Oklahoma
(Photo by Don Viney)

Charles Hartshorne and J. Clayton Feaver
April 7, 1987, Edmond, Oklahoma
(Photo by Don Viney)

Woman (unidentified) and Charles Hartshorne
April 7, 1987, Edmond, Oklahoma
(Photo by Don Viney)

Don Viney and Charles Hartshorne
April 7, 1987, Edmond, Oklahoma
(Photo by Tamatha Gimlin)

February 1988: I attended a conference in Austin, Texas given in honor of Hartshorne
and of the soon to be published The Philosophy of Charles Hartshorne, in the LLP series.
Schubert Ogden, David Griffin, Lewis Ford, Dan Dombrowski, Lewis Hahn (editor of the
volume), Nancy Howell, Barry Whitney, George Nordgulen, George Shields, Jorge Nobo, and
Robert Kane were present.47

47

Papers at the conference, with Hartshorne’s replies, were published. See Robert Kane and Stephen
Phillips (eds.) Hartshorne, Process Philosophy and Theology (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989).
Professor Kane invited me to contribute a paper, which I did. It was the second of four times during Hartshorne’s
life when something I wrote was published in the same book or journal to which he had contributed something.
The first time was when Shields contacted me to contribute a paper to the Eugene Peters’ festschrift, Faith and
Creativity: Essays in Honor of Eugene Peters, edited by Nordgulen and Shields (St. Louis: CBP Press, 1987). My
paper is titled “Faith as a Creative Act: Kierkegaard and Lequier on the Relation of Faith and Reason.” I believe that
the Austin conference was the first time that I met George Shields. He and I have long-standing friendship that has
involved some fruitful collaborative efforts.
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Griffin told a story about Hartshorne’s absentmindedness. According to Griffin, Dorothy
had counseled Charles to be friendlier to his students. One day Charles saw a student walking
across campus with a baby stroller. When he asked about the student’s baby she replied, “But
Professor Hartshorne, this is Emily, your baby, and I’m your baby sitter.” Hartshorne was clearly
displeased with the story. He leaned over and said to me, “That never happened. I’d never forget
my own baby.”48
1990: Hartshorne’s autobiography, The Darkness and the Light, was published.
Hartshorne included photographs of me (from April 1987) and of my father (from April 1983)
standing with him.
September 29, 1991: The Center for Process Studies in Claremont, California hosted a
celebration of the achievements of Hartshorne and of the publication of the LLP volume. John B.
Cobb, Jr., David Griffin, Marjorie Suchocki, Mary Elizabeth Moore, and Charles Birch gave
papers. Also present were John G. Arapura, Barry Whitney, and Santiago Sia.

Charles Hartshorne
(Marjorie Suchocki in foreground)
September 29, 1991, Claremont,
California

48

Charles Hartshorne
September 29, 1991, Claremont, California
(Photos by Don Viney)

In his autobiography, Hartshorne admits to being absentminded, but dismisses as “absurd” and “untrue
legends” stories about forgetting his daughter. See The Darkness and the Light: 20.
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Hartshorne gave a presentation. He used an overhead projector to display a couple of
diagrams and charts. At one point he got tangled in the electrical cords and Suchocki had to
come to his aid. He stood directly between the projector and the screen and pointed at the screen
as he spoke. This was all quite entertaining and somehow appropriate. After all, we had come not
only to honor his ideas but to honor the man, and if this day the man eclipsed the ideas it was
only fitting.49 I recall a quip that Hartshorne made during this meeting concerning his doctrine of
dual transcendence. He said that when he is accused of denying the transcendence of God he
replies that he believes in twice as much transcendence of everyone else.
October 10, 1997: Robert Kane, at the University of Texas-Austin, organized a
celebration and conference honoring the centennial of Hartshorne’s birthday. Kane invited me,
William Myers, Randy Auxier, Barry Whitney, and George R. Lucas to present papers. 50 Hank
Steuver, writing for the Austin-American Statesman, referred to us as “the Hartshorne fan
club.”51 There is some truth in this description. Our excitement, however, was tempered with the
knowledge that this would probably be the last time that we would see the master. And, indeed,
for me, at least, it was.
Also present for the conference was William L. Reese, co-editor with Hartshorne of
Philosophers Speak of God (1953), and Hartshorne’s grandson, Charles Goodman (at the time a
graduate student in philosophy at the University of Michigan). I had the opportunity to speak at
length with both Reese and Goodman. Reese later wrote to me asking for a written
recommendation of Philosophers Speak of God which was to be republished by Humanity Books
in 2000. He used my remarks in the Addendum to the Preface, though without mentioning my
name (pp. x-xi), which, I admit, pains me. However, Reese kindly wrote the foreword to my
second book on Jules Lequyer.52 Goodman, an intense and intelligent young man, but not
unfriendly, had very little knowledge of his grandfather’s philosophy. He seemed much more
interested in developing his own ideas. I asked myself if this is what the young Hartshorne was
like.

49

With the exception of Birch’s paper, the papers from this gathering and Hartshorne’s remarks on them
were published in Process Studies 21/2 (Summer 1992).
50
The papers were published in The Personalist Forum 14/2 (Fall 1998).
51
Austin-American Statesman, Monday October 13, 1997, p. 1 and A6. Steuver’s story was picked up by
the Norman Oklahoma Transcript, Thursday, October 23, 1997, p. 20.
52
Hartshorne sparked my interest in Lequyer (or Lequier) (1814-1862) because of his many references
and allusions to the little-known French philosopher in his writings. A paper I wrote on Lequyer and Kierkegaard for
one of Tom Boyd’s classes was one of my earliest publications, in the festschrift for Eugene Peters, mentioned
above. I’ve written more on Lequyer than any other English language philosopher. My most complete statement is
“Jules Lequyer (Lequier) (1814-1862)” Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. http://www.iep.utm.edu/lequyer/
(September 18, 2013).
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After Lucas gave the key-note presentation, Charles Richey, Hartshorne’s caretaker
entered the room pushing Hartshorne in a wheelchair. Hartshorne was wearing a broad-rimmed
leather hat and Velcro tennis shoes. When Richey wheeled Hartshorne down the center aisle, the
audience stood and applauded. Hartshorne said a few words into a hand-held microphone. He
addressed the questions that had been on all of our minds. “Old age is almost a disease,” he said.
“I have no nameable disease. I can’t think as fast as I used to. I can’t do anything as fast.” After
this we had refreshments and I spoke briefly with him. I do not believe he recognized me.

Charles Hartshorne
October 10, 1997, Austin, Texas
(Photo by Don Viney)

Charles Hartshorne (seated), left to right: Don Viney, William Myers,
Randy Auxier, Barry Whitney, and George R. Lucas, Jr.
October 10, 1997 Austin, Texas
(Photographer Unknown)

Monday, October 9, 2000: Charles Richey reported that Hartshorne died in his sleep at
his home in Austin. In light of Hartshorne’s admiration for certain elements of Judaism, it was
fitting that October 9th was Yom Kippur, the holiest day of the year on the Jewish calendar, a
time of solemn repentance and fasting. I remember this because on that day I was singing as part
of a small choir in the synagogue in Joplin, Missouri, as had been my practice for several years.
The New York Times incorrectly reported Hartshorne’s death as occurring on October 10th. The
Times obituary used, without attribution, a photo I took of Hartshorne at Claremont in 1991. (The
photo, with proper attribution, is on the cover of Creative Experiencing: A Philosophy of
Freedom, Hartshorne’s last book, edited by me and Jincheol O, published by SUNY in 2011.)
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Publications by Donald Wayne Viney Concerning Hartshorne
Series on Charles Hartshorne, all co-authored with George Shields: “Charles Hartshorne:
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Hartshorne (Albany: State University of New York Press, September 2011).
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Hartshorne’s “Le principe de relativité philosophique chez Whitehead” (1950); “Peirce,
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“Relativizing the Classical Tradition: Hartshorne’s History of God,” Models of God and
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Originally published in Philosophia: Philosophical Quarterly of Israel (2007) 35:3-4, Special
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“Preface” to Gott im Werden. Die Prozesstheologie Charles Hartshorne [God in Process: The
Process Theology of Charles Hartshorne] by Julia Enxing. (Regensburg: Verlag Friedrich Pustet,
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John R. Shook (London: Thoemmes Press, 2005): 1056-62.
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